Volume 31
Issue 1 Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference (Winter 2001)
Winter 2001

Suits against the States: The Changing Law of Immunities
Michael B. Browde
University of New Mexico - Main Campus

Erwin Chemerinsky
Ruth Kovnat

Recommended Citation
Michael B. Browde, Erwin Chemerinsky & Ruth Kovnat, Suits against the States: The Changing Law of
Immunities, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 149 (2001).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol31/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

SUITS AGAINST THE STATES:
THE CHANGING LAW OF IMMUNITIES
PANEL
MICHAEL B. BROWDE*
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*"
RUTH KOVNAT""
PROFESSOR BROWDE: My name is Michael Browde. I am on the faculty at
the University of New Mexico School of Law. We are also joined by Ruth Kovnat,
a colleague of mine at the New Mexico School of Law. You all know Erwin
Chemerinsky, a professor at the University of Southern California. The primary
focus of what we are trying to do this afternoon is engage in a discussion about
some state immunity issues. With that in mind, Ruth, do you want to make a few
comments about Erwin's presentation on immunities?'
PROFESSOR KOVNAT: It is shocking in a way to be living and thinking about
state immunity issues at a time of a true revolution. I would not be the first to talk
about immunity as a debate between the judicial power and the power of the
political branches. To some extent, the Supreme Court is reemphasizing that it is the
primary province of the judicial branch to police the Constitution, and that includes
policing the boundaries of federal and state power, which are not explicitly set out
in the federal Constitution. To the extent that the Supreme Court enforces these
structural limitations on national power and expansions of state power, there is an
increase in judicial power at the expense of Congress.
BROWDE: I just finished a Continuing Legal Education presentation for the
State Bar of New Mexico, which was billed as a review of civil procedure. I
reviewed the Supreme Court procedural cases and my colleague, Ted Occhialino,
did the New Mexico cases. This year, I threw all the procedural cases out, and said
to my friends in the bar, "Something is happening that affects every one of you." I
spent time on this historic, revolutionary change in federalism because I think that
virtually every federal statute is now up for grabs. Anybody who has a claim under
a federal statute ought to think, "Wait a minute, is this statute going to be subject to
attack?" Anybody who is defending a claim brought against a federal statute ought
to think in terms of its validity, which most of us just ran by in previous years. I
think the three of us panelists share a view of the difficulties, and perhaps the
criticisms, of what the Supreme Court has done. With that in mind, if people have
questions, let's have them.
KRISTIN MORGAN-TRACY: 2 I am trying to work out in my mind what is left.
In discrimination statutes, whom can you sue, whom can't you sue, and where can
you sue them? What is left, particularly with age discrimination?

* Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law.
** Professor, University of Southern California School of Law.

* Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law.
I. Prof. Chemerinsky made his comments during this conference in a keynote presentation, The Federalism
Revolution, reprinted in this volume.
2. Attorney at Law, Kennedy & Han, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
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BROWDE: Recently, I have found it interesting to talk to practicing lawyers who
are either bringing claims against states or defending suits on behalf of states. They
3
get involved with the Eleventh Amendment and, lo and behold, the resolution of
the Eleventh Amendment question has nothing to do with the Eleventh Amendment.
It has to do with whether the particular federal statute that seems to allow a claim
against a state is valid, not under the Eleventh Amendment, but under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the last section, says,
"Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article."5 So what is appropriate legislation? There are a series of cases from the
1970s in which the Court upheld portions of the Voting Rights Act." Although there
was some debate in those cases, there was a good deal of deference to what
Congress did. There was recognition that Congress has some authority7to go beyond
the scope of the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then9 comes
the line of cases starting with the Religious Freedom Restoration0 Acte case to the
recent cases that have narrowed the scope of Congress's power.'
It is clear now, as perhaps it was not then, that Congress has a limited power. It
has a power to remedy and to perhaps prevent constitutional violations. There is no
question that Congress's intent must be clear." What Congress may not do is declare
new constitutional rights.' 2 In terms of keeping Congress within the limited,
remedial, preventive mechanism the Court has articulated, there must be congruence
is
and proportionality between the constitutional violations that Congress
to do so.13
supposedly taking care of and the means that they have chosen
We cannot forget that the Fourteenth Amendment only limits governmental
actions, and therefore, it is not an appropriate use of the Section Five power to go
beyond state action.' 4 So what do we know? We know the discrimination in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 5 is not a valid abrogation because distinctions
6
based on age are subject to rational basis scrutiny. In essence, Congress imposed
7 Now before the Court is the Americans with Disabilities
heightened scrutiny.'

3. U.S. CONST. amend. Xi.
4.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

5. Id. at § 5.
6. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974c (1994).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
9. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,532-36 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
unconstitutional as an impermissible expansion of rights).
10. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding the Violence Against Women Act
unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 567-68 (1995) (holding the Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of
Congress's Commerce Clause power).
11. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986).
12. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 519 (holding that Congress may not expand the scope of rights or create new

rights).
13. Id. at 520.
14. Id. at 519.
15. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
16. Kimel v. Fla. Bd., 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) ("The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause
does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision.").
17. See id. at 88 (finding that the Act's substantive requirements "remain at a level akin to the Court's
heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause").
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Act, 8 which is very much a struggle of analysis about the legislative history and
what Congress was trying to do and how it sought to do it.' 9 The last point I would
like to make is the one Erwin also made, and that is, this is just life in the real world.
All of these standards are being applied to statutes that were enacted long before
these were the rules of the game. So, in that regard it is tough.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I agree with everything Michael said. It seems
to me there are two questions that I would ask in answering your question about
whom you can and cannot sue. One is, who is the defendant in the particular case?
The second is, what is the particular law? Let me just say a word about why I think
those are the relevant questions.
In terms of who is the defendant, there are three possible kinds of defendants.
One is a private entity. We need to remember that Congress can only regulate
private entities if Congress is acting under some authority other than Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment." In other words, Congress would have to be acting
under the commerce power or under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, 2'
because the Supreme Court has overruled that part of The Civil Rights Cases.22 The
Court has said, in cases like Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 23 and Runyon v.
McCrary,' that Congress can prevent private race discrimination under Section Two
of.the Thirteenth Amendment. 25 The second possible defendant is a city or county
government where the government is not part of the state and not immune under the
Eleventh Amendment.' Then, Congress can act under either the commerce power
or under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The third kind of defendant is the state government where Congress can only
authorize suits if it is acting under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 The
Age Discrimination Employment Act was not a valid exercise of Congress's Section
Five power, but it was a valid exercise of the commerce power. 28 So to answer your
specific question, private entities and cities can still be sued for age discrimination
because they are not given Eleventh Amendment protection. State governments,
however, cannot. As Michael points out, the Americans With Disabilities Act issue
is now before the Supreme Court. 29 There is no doubt that private entities and local
governments will be able to be sued. Whether state governments can be sued
depends on whether there is a valid exercise of Section Five.

18. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
19. See Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
20. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5; See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830. 837 (1982).
21. U.S. CONsT. amend XII, § 2.
22. United States v. Stanley ("Civil Rights Cases"), 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
23. 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) (Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power includes the power to enact laws
"direct and primary,operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not.")(citing
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883)).
24. 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976).
25. U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 2.
dissenting)
26. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 430 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
(noting that "municipalities cannot claim the State's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment").
27. See Martin v. Kan., 190 F.3d 1120, 1126 (10th Cir. 1999).
28. E.E.O.C. v. Wyo., 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
29. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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30
The same week that the Supreme Court decided Kimel v. FloridaBoard, the
3
Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded two Equal Pay Act cases that said
32
state governments could be sued for violating the Equal Pay Act. Now, Justice
O'Connor in Kimel said that age is different from gender and race because gender
and race get heightened scrutiny.33 The Equal Pay Act is about gender.
I thought that the Supreme Court would simply deny review or maybe even
affirm, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded, and I am
not sure what to make of that. We could go on with a long list, for example, Title
VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964.34 There is no doubt Title VII is constitutional
with regard to private employers, because it is a valid exercise of a commerce
power.3 5 What about the states where it expands rights like in allowing the disparate
impact theory? 36 Is that unconstitutional? That seems to be the place where we do
not know the answer to your question.
KOVNAT: I agree with Michael and Erwin, and I would add only one thing with
respect to Title VII. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,37 the Supreme Court opinion that gave
birth to the abrogation doctrine itself, was a Title VII case. So, I remain optimistic
that those kinds of statutes will still be upheld even though they are based on
disparate impact.
BROWDE: But the issue is Section Five. If a statute survived a Section Five
challenge, then you have got a suit against the state.
CHEMERINSKY: I think it is very hard to think of why a disparate impact theory
under Title VII could be brought against state governments. Isn't it analogous to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act?38 The Supreme Court says you have to prove
discriminatory intent. 39 Congress says discriminatory impact is sufficient.40 Isn't that
Congress expanding the scope of rights? I will give you another example that is
outside the employment context. I find it hard to see how the Court, under its current
jurisprudence, can uphold the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982."
I think of the analogy between that statute and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. The Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden 2 said that proof of discriminatory
impact is not enough. Rather, to challenge an election system, like an at-large voting

30. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
31. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 201 (1994 & Supp. IV. 1998).
State Univ., 150 F.3d 706 (1998), rev'd & remanded by, Ill. State Univ. v. Varner, 528 U.S.
32. Varner v. W1.
1110 (2000); Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y., 169 F.3d 117, 121 (1999), rev'd & remanded by, State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Anderson, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000).
33. Kimel v. Fla. Bd., 528 U.S. 62, 83-84(2000).
34. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
35. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 n.6 ('Title VII... was enacted pursuant to
the commerce power to regulate purely private decisionmaking.....).
36. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The Act proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.").
37. 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976).
38.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb(4) (1994 & Supp. H 1996).

39. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-89 (1990).
40. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1393, n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(b)(1) restored the compelling interest test recognized under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which
allows for a cause of action when the burden on the exercise of religion is indirect).
41.
42.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-6 (1994).
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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scheme, you have to prove discriminatory purpose.4 3 Congress came along in the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 and said, "We are going to amend this to
say that it is a statutory violation if you can prove disparate impact in an election
scheme." In Thornburg v. Gingles " there is a disparate impact standard. Isn't that
Congress expanding the scope of rights to overturn a Supreme Court case just like
Freedom Restoration Act was doing relative to Employment Division
the Religious
6
v. Smith?
BROWDE: That seems to bring you back to the Section Five cases. Some
of the
language in the new cases, though very limited, indicates that Congress has the
power to both remedy and prevent.4 7 In Mobile, Justice Marshall, in his dissent, said
that the discriminatory intent was there, but it was just too hard to prove and there
was enough evidence of the fact that the discrimination existed. He reasoned that the
severity of the standard prevented the proof; therefore, disparate impact equaled a
violation."
PAUL FRYE: 49 Are you saying that the way to get around the problem was the
Voting Rights Act? That Congress was merely adjusting standards of proof and the
constitutional violations in the Acts are the same? That Congress is merely implying
a different standard of proof than the Court suggests was necessary?
CHEMERINSKY: I am personally skeptical of that argument because whether
or not there is a violation depends on the standard of proof. Under Mobile the Los
Angeles City Council's districting would not have been a violation." Under the
1982 Voting Rights Act, the action would have been a violation. Isn't that the
clearest indication of an expansion of rights? For that matter, wasn't the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act51 just about the standard of proof? It changed the standard
of proof back to strict scrutiny. Yet the Court said that is an expansion of rights and
that is not allowed.52
BROWDE: It is an uphill, tough row to hoe. But at least in the legislation back
then, we found evidence of constitutional violations and they were categorized as
burden of proof problems. If we do not allow Congress to make those types of
determinations, then Congress cannot prevent constitutional violations. The whole
notion is that there is some give in Congress's ability. After all, Congress can make
legislative judgments that we cannot make. At least in the earlier cases there was

43. Id. at 62.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).

45. 478 U.S. 30,44(1986).
46. 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)(holding that laws that unintentionally and incidentally burden religion do not
offend the First Amendment).
47. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) ("While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate
remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.").
48. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 137 (1980).
49. Attorney at Law, Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Schoenburg & Enfield, Albuquerque, New
Mexico.

50. According to Chemerinsky, roughly ten years ago the Los Angeles City Council's districting was
challenged for having a racially discriminatory impact. With impact as a basis for liability under the 1982 Voting
Rights Act Amendments, the city ultimately settled the suit. Telephone Interview with Erwin Chemerinsky,
Professor, University of Southern California (February 8, 2001).
51. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
52. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997).
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much language about needing to leave Congress with some flexibility to make those
legislative judgments.
KOVNAT: There is some lip service paid to that idea.
FRYE: When I was taking Constitutional Law about twenty-three years ago with
Professor Tribe, 3 he was talking about a constitutional dialogue that would be
between Congress and the courts. There is no dialogue here. It seems like there is
an ossification, at least from Congress's point of view, and the Court is free to do
what it wants.
KOVNAT: Welcome to the revolution. Let me be a slight skeptic. The Court does
say in cases like Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings4 and Kimel that there were not adequate legislative findings to show
the law was congruent or proportionate." I think the question is, How sincere is the
Court in that?
If the Court is sincere in saying that if there were the appropriate findings, then
the law would be allowed, then maybe there is something of a dialogue. Congress
could come back and prove that there is an extensive pattern of state violations of
intellectual property and reenact the law authorizing suits against states. If the Court
allowed it, that would be a form of dialogue.
I think the Americans With Disabilities Act is important because now we have
a Section Five case where there is the legislative record of state violations. The
question is, Do findings matter? That is why United States v. Morrison"6 is
important, in the Commerce Clause context, for those who believedthat this debate
is really about the need for findings by Congress. The Violence Against Women Act
had findings, but they did not matter in Morrison.
BROWDE: Not only that, but there is an express statement by the Court in
Morrison. The Court says there are findings, but these are ultimately judicial
judgments that must be made here.57 That is put as starkly as it could be in terms of
separation of powers. That is what I found eye opening about it. My dear friend
Ruth Kovnat said, "You just missed the boat. It was there in Lopez" and you just did
not want to see it."
CHEMERINSKY: Lopez was just a nice signal to Congress, "Mind your p's and
q's and you can still do what you have been doing." It all comes down to what
appeals to a particular Justice. If one of the five in the majority, say hypothetically
O'Connor, had found that the legislative findings for the Violence Against Women
Act 59 were sufficient, we would be having a very different discussion now. The same
thing applies with ADA.

53. Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard Law School.
54. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
55. Kimel v. Fla. Bd., 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (finding the ADEA requirements "disproportionate to any
unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act").
56. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (noting that the statute in question was supported by
numerous congressional findings).
57. Id.
58. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (stating that the Court considers legislative findings
in making its independent evaluation) (emphasis added).
59. Violence Against Women Act of 1994,42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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BROWDE: Much harder to ignore is the true clash between the Court and
Congress in the face of those findings. It is hard to ignore the lack of judicial
restraint that would emerge if the findings were ignored.
JAMES WEGER:6 Given that most of these decisions are five to four, very close
votes, do you think that a change in the makeup of the Court would cause an aboutface on these decisions? Or is the Supreme Court still wrestling with decisions, like
Roe v. Wade,61 that a lot of the Justices do not agree with today, but refuse to
overturn?
CHEMERINSKY: In Kimel, Stevens wrote a dissent saying, I believe that
Seminole Tribe was wrong. 62 I think it is quite likely that if the vacancy in the Court
was in the five in the majority and it was selected by, say, Gore, and was of a like
3
mind to Stevens, I think it would be overruled. When Garcia overruled National
League," Rehnquist wrote this very short dissent in which he said, "They got the
votes today, we are going to get them in the future because a little bit more needs to
be said."65 I thought Stevens' dissent in Kimel, in January, was the same thing. On
the other hand, if the next president is Bush and he's sincere about appointing more
Scalias and Thomases, then we are talking about doctrines that will not only
continue, but be expanded through the rest of our careers.
KOVNAT: Other thoughts and questions about any of this?
INGA MUNSINGER:" I am concerned about the implications. The Tenth Circuit
seems to be going out on a limb in recognizing a waiver of sovereign immunity by
removing cases to federal court. I was wondering if you thought other circuits would
follow what the Tenth is doing, or if the Tenth Circuit may get slapped down for it.
KOVNAT: I think Erwin mentioned that the Tenth Circuit appears to be
following Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v.
Schact.67 It is not so odd a notion that when you invoke the federal forum you have
consented to be sued in the federal forum. That is a traditional notion of consent. So,
although the Tenth Circuit has gone far, I do not personally think that it is such a
peculiar notion.
CHEMERINSKY: I have two thoughts. One is, I think the underlying question
is, Who in the state can waive the state's sovereign immunity? If you believe that
the state's attorney general's office can waive the sovereign immunity, then you are
absolutely right, that removal waives sovereign immunity. However, if you say that
only the state legislature can waive a state's sovereign immunity, then there is a
strong argument that removal by a state attorney general cannot be a waiver.

60. Attorney at Law, Jones, Givens, Gotcher & Bogan, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
61. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy).
62. Kimel v. Fla. Bd., 528 U.S. 62, 97 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Seminole Tribe v. Fla..
517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
63. Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
64. Nat'l League v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
65. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579-80.
66. Law Clerk for the Honorable Robert Baldock, District Judge, United States District Court, District of
New Mexico.
67. 524 U.S. 381, 393-98 (1998) (advocating "a rule of waiver in every case where the State, through its
attorneys, consents to removal").
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The Supreme Court has said that in the context of federal sovereign immunity,
only Congress can waive the U.S. sovereign immunity." The Court has analogized
the U.S. sovereign immunity to a state's sovereign immunity, so it becomes a little
more questionable. The Tenth Circuit is not alone in this regard. Generally, the
circuits are much more willing to limit the scope of the Eleventh Amendment or
broaden the waiver. Hill v. Blind Industries& Services69 is a Ninth Circuit case from
last June. It involved a diversity suit for breach of contract in federal court.7 ° There
were extensive pretrial proceedings, a pretrial conference, and pretrial discovery.7
On the day of the trial, the defendant says to the Court, "We forgot to tell you that
we are really an agency of the State of Maryland, so we are protected by the
Eleventh Amendment.
You have to throw this out based on the Eleventh
' 72
Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit held that the state, by choosing to participate in pretrial
proceedings, had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.73 Now, the usual
notion is that you cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction just by participating in
proceedings. 74 You can raise it any time. 75 But the Eleventh Amendment is different
because it can be waived.76 The Ninth Circuit said that participation in pretrial
proceedings was a waiver.77 Can the state, through its attorney general waive
sovereign immunity, or does it take something from the legislature? That seems to
be the underlying question with regard to Hill.
MUNSINGER: It seems unfair to the parties, such as in the Hill case, to get
surprised on the day of trial with removal. But, there is a lot of subject matter, which
seems very strange and unfair, yet is strictly enforced.
KOVNAT: The question really is whether Eleventh Amendment or sovereign
immunity is subject matter jurisdiction or just akin to subject matter jurisdiction as
the Supreme Court characterized it in Edelman v. Jordan,' because the doctrine of
sovereign immunity itself contains the limitation except by consent.79 The focus is
on determining what conduct constitutes consent. It is fair to say that it is completely
cloudy, but also there is room for making arguments. Litigation activity, if engaged
in by an authorized state officer, can constitute consent.
CHEMERINSKY: I agree. The only thing is that in Edelman it was not raised
until the court of appeals level." The Supreme Court said that it was fine because

68. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 787 (1999) (citing Justice Blair's seriatim opinion in Chisholm v. Ga.,

2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 419, 449 (1793)).
69. 179 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1999).
70. Id. at 756.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
State may

Id.
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id at 756.
Id.
College Says. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) ("[A]
waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.").

77. Hill, 179 F.3d at 763.
78. 415 U.S. 661,662-63 (1974), reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974).

79. Id at 662-63 ("[Tlhis Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.").
80. Id at 678 ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional
bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court.").

Winter 2001 ]

THE LAW OF IMMUNITIES

it was akin to subject matter jurisdiction."' I think that is inconsistent with the Hill
case.
CARL SHEWMAKER:8 2 What are the problems in suing states?
KOVNAT: You can think of it as a pendulum. There was a period in American
constitutional history that looked quite a bit like the direction that this is going.
When the real world need for national legislation, that is the depression, occurred,
a more realistic rather than formalistic interpretation of the Constitution came about.
CHEMERINSKY: I think that the Court is saying that this should be done at the
state rather than the federal level. It is significant that in most of these cases the
Court was invalidating federal laws in areas that traditionally have been regulated
by the states.
Forty-one states, according to the Rehnquist opinion, already have laws that
prevent guns in your schools. Violence against women is traditionally a matter of
state domestic violence law or civil suits. That explains those cases. I don't think it
explains all of the cases. Regulating nuclear waste seems to be inherently more a
federal interest. 8 I think these Supreme Court decisions are going to shift the focus
from the federal to the state level.
KOVNAT: In the early days when the major federal environmental laws86were
5
enacted, the architect of both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act was
Senator Muskie. I attended conferences where Senator Muskie's chief drafters
would stand up and say, "Do you want to know what the scope of the Environmental
Protection Agency's power is over water? You see the water in this glass as it moves
from the table to my lips? That water, and that water alone, is excluded from the
reach of the EPA under the commerce power." There was no question that there was
recognition in Congress for the need of national legislation. Interestingly, federal
environmental laws that are most vulnerable are the provisions of the Clean Water
Act that regulate isolated wetlands.8 7 These are the areas that are just not connected
hydrologically to any other water. Endangered Species Act regulations, fish and
wildlife regulations (particularly to the extent that they regulate the taking of species
on private land) post-Lopez and Morrison, those regulations are vulnerable. The
Court has granted certiorari on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' power to regulate
waste fill in an isolated wetland where there are findings that it is used as a habitat
for migratory birds. So, I hope we will get a little guidance on that.
BROWDE: Your question and the other comments on this subject cause me to
think about not the Court, but Congress itself. That leads me back to the points that
Erwin made earlier about ways in which Congress can act under the Commerce
Clause. It can regulate the channels of interstate commerce and the instrumentalities

81. Id.
82. Attorney at Law, Eureka, Kansas.
83. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (noting that over forty states have "criminal laws
outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds").
84. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1992) (recognizing that Congress has the power to
regulate the disposal of low level radioactive waste under the Commerce Clause).
85. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
86. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
87. 1l at §1344(t).
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and things in interstate commerce only if those things have a substantial effect.8 I
wonder if Congress, at least on the commerce side of this revolution, might focus
on instrumentalities and things. One theme that runs through these cases is providing
jurisdictional hooks or jurisdictional requirements of proof that require a case-bycase determination. In order to enforce criminal law or the regulatory scheme, the
prosecutor is going to have to prove, as an element of the case, a particular
connectedness or use of a channel.
The dicta in Lopez suggest that there was no jurisdictional hook because there
was no evidence that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce.8 9 I think Congress
will be forced to do more of that, which will make statutes more convoluted, their
enforcement more difficult, and the prosecution of cases more difficult. I think that
is one of the realities, not just in terms of the judicial gain, but on the legislative side
as well. We will see very crazy statutes.
CHEMERINSKY: There is language in both Lopez" and in Morrison9' about
these being areas traditionally left to the states. If I Was litigating one of these cases,
I might emphasize that in areas that have not been traditionally regulated by the
states, as long as there had been regulation in areas of special federal concern, the
Court should take a different approach, or apply the three-part test more broadly. If
arguing to the Court, I would try to make a lot out of the language in Rehnquist's
opinion, that these are traditional areas for the states. I would distinguish areas that
have not been traditional for the states.
KOVNAT: The flip side is legislation like the Hate Crimes bill. 92 It is hard to see
what the constitutional power is to support that legislation under this regime. I do
not know if you have given some thought to that?
CHEMERINSKY: No, I think it is very difficult. Once Congress cannot regulate
private behavior under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are left with
just the Commerce Clause.
KOVNAT: Right. Certainly these crimes are traditionally under state law,
perhaps not the enhancement part. I do not see how it survives.
FRYE: Does section 1985 indicate that at least some private conduct ought to be
within the purview of this Section Five power?
KOVNAT: You would think that the Supreme Court thinks so emphatically. The
majority in Morrison emphatically reaffirmed the old civil rights cases that insisted
on state action. 93
CHEMERINSKY: What is interesting about the Thirteenth Amendment is that
The Civil Rights Cases" said that Congress could only regulate government
behavior under the Thirteenth Amendment.9 Then, in 1968 Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. overruled that, saying that Congress has the authority under the
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Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate private race discrimination.' Then Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union 7 comes to the Supreme Court addressing the meaning of
section 19819' in private discrimination based on race in contracting, which was
adopted under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. The specific issue that
comes to the Supreme Court is a seemingly narrow one. Is racial harassment formed
after the contract prohibited by section 1981? The Supreme Court had oral argument
and .briefing and then granted certiorari on the question of whether Jones and
Runyon" should be overruled in allowing Congress to regulate private behavior. The
Supreme Court then, after hearing oral argument, held nine to zero that Congress,
°
under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment,' can regulate private behavior,
but held five to four that racial harassment after the contract does not violate section
1981.101 Now, that was a nine-to-zero decision and it was a 1989 case. So, it was
eleven years ago, but that is before all of these federalism developments. It is hard
to know why you draw a distinction between the cases, other than that the Thirteenth
Amendment relates to private conduct.
BROWDE: Perhaps what this indicates in terms of congressional power is that
Congress will dust off the Thirteenth Amendment.
KOVNAT: Only as to race.
BROWDE: It does limit us to race, but at least it takes a fresh look at that. I feel
for the people in Congress these days because we all know that Congresspersons are
going to say, "I want to do this, you figure out a way to do it."
MUNSINGER: Does section 1985 apply to federalism?
CHEMERINSKY: Anybody who is involved in a conspiracy to violate
somebody's civil rights could be sued under section 1985.102 Section 1985 is not
limited to conspiracies that interfere with civil rights that are racial in nature. Any
conspiracy to interfere with people's civil rights is actionable under section 1985.1'3
I would like to say constitutional, but I do not know how it is going to be in a nonrace context after Morrison,"°4 because it applies to private interference with rights.
CHEMERINSKY: It's been a long day. Thank you.
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